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No.20070117 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THOMAS PECK, aka Thomas Joseph Peck, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, and the UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Defendants-appellants State of Utah and the Utah Highway Patrol, 
collectively, "Highway Patrol," submit this brief in sxipport of their interlocutory 
appeal from an order denying their motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code section 
78-2-2(j), conferring jurisdiction on this Court over orders of any court of record 
over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2® (West 2004). On April 20, 2007, this Court entered an 
order granting the Highway Patrol's petition for interlocutory appeal from the 
denial of its motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Immunity from Suit 
Governmental immunity is retained from claims for an injury that "arises 
out of, in connection with, or results from . . . the incarceration of any person in 
any . . . place of legal confinement." The injuries Plaintiff sustained happened 
after troopers arrested him and restrained him in handcuffs, but before he was 
transported to the jail. Is the Highway Patrol immune from liability for the 
troopers' alleged negligence? 
A. Standard of review 
A trial court's decision whether to dismiss claims on grounds of 
governmental immunity is a legal determination that this Court reviews for 
correctness, without deference to the trial court's decision. Hall v. Utah State 
Dep 't ofCorrs., 2001 UT 34, H 11, 24 P.3d 958. Moreover, a trial court's 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this Court also reviews for 
correctness. Blackner v. Dep 7 ofTransp., 2002 UT 44,1J8, 48 P.3d 949. 
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B. Preservation of issue 
The Highway Patrol raised this issue in its motion to dismiss and in its 
subsequent motion for judgment on the pleadings. R. 17-25; 76-86. The trial court 
entered an order denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings on January 19, 
2007. R. 98-102. A copy of that order is attached as Addendum A. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutory provisions are attached in Addendum B to this 
brief: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4 (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (West 2004) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings based on governmental immunity. Plaintiff Thomas 
Peck sued the Highway Patrol for injuries he sustained in a fall after two troopers 
arrested and handcuffed him, but before he was transported to jail. 
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Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Peck sued the Highway Patrol for injuries that he claimed were caused by 
the negligence of two troopers. R. 1-13. The Highway Patrol filed a motion to 
dismiss claiming that it was immune from liability because Peck's injuries arose 
out of his incarceration in a place of legal confinement. R. 17-25. The trial court 
denied the motion. R. 64-5. Subsequently, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an 
opinion in Pace v. St. George City Police Dep % 2006 UT App. 494, U 4 , 153 
P.3d 789, that supported the Highway Patrol's position on the applicability of 
immunity. The Highway Patrol filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
reiterating its claim of immunity supported by Pace and the plain language of the 
immunity act. R. 76-7. After the motion was fully briefed, R. 78-86; 87-91; 92-5, 
the trial court issued a written decision denying the motion. R. 98-102 (Addendum 
A). On February 21, 2007, the Highway Patrol timely filed a petition for 
interlocutory appeal with this Court, R. 105-07, which was granted on April 20, 
2007. R. 108. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are based solely on the material allegations of Peck's 
Complaint, which should be assumed to be true at this stage of this case, that is, on 
review of a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rules 12(b)(6)and 12 (c) of 
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the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hall, 2001 UT 34 at If 12; see also Wagner 
v. State, 2005 UT 54, U 9, 122 P.3d 599, 602 (reviewing dismissal of negligence 
claim based on statutory immunity). 
On September 17, 2002, two Highway Patrol troopers arrested Peck for 
driving under the influence of alcohol. R. 3, Complaint % 11. After the troopers 
arrested Peck, they restrained him in handcuffs. R. 3, Complaint ^ 11. The 
troopers then ordered Peck to stand in front of the patrol car while the rear seat of 
the car was cleared so that he could be transported to the jail. R. 3, Complaint % 12. 
Peck stood in front of the patrol car with his back turned to it and refused to face 
the car. R. 3, Complaint ^ 17. When the troopers attempted to force Peck to face 
the car, he fell and was injured. R. 3, Complaint ffl| 13, 14. Peck alleges that he 
was injured because the troopers "negligently allowed [Peck] to fall on his face." 
R. 3 & 6, Complaint^f 17, 31. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Peck's negligence claim against the Highway Patrol is barred by an 
exception to the Highway Patrol's waiver of immunity for the negligence of its 
employees.1 The governmental immunity act retains immunity for any injury that 
'Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (West 2004). Effective July 1, 2004, the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act was replaced by the Governmental Immunity 
Act of Utah. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30d-101 to -904 (West 2004). Because 
the events here took place before the effective date of the new act, the provisions 
-5-
"arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . the incarceration of any 
person in any . . . place of legal confinement." Peck was injured after Highway 
Patrol troopers arrested and handcuffed him. Because he was in the control of the 
Highway Patrol, was not able toieave without permission, and was in an area of 
defined boundaries, he was incarcerated in a place of legal confinement. Thus, the 
exception to the waiver of the Highway Patrol's immunity precludes Peck's 
claims. 
Argument 
The Highway Patrol is statutorily immune from liability for Peck's 
alleged injuries because those injuries arose out of, were in connection 
with, or were a result of Peck's incarceration in a place of legal 
confinement. 
Utah courts make three inquiries to determine whether governmental 
immunity precludes a suit against a governmental entity. Wagner, 2005 UT 54 at 
Tf 12. First, the court determines whether the activity was a governmental function 
and entitled to blanket immunity. Second, if the activity was a governmental 
function, the court examines if another section of the act waives immunity. Third, 
the court determines whether an exception to the immunity waiver applies and 
of the old act are cited. The provision at issue in this case, however, is 
substantially the same in both acts. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301 (j) 
with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10). 
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retains immunity in the particular case. Id. 
Here, the first two questions are not in dispute.2 It is the last question that is 
at issue in this case - whether an exception to the waiver of immunicy applies aiid 
retains the Highway Patrol's immunity from suit. 
At the time of Peck's injuries in this case, the governmental immunity act 
read as follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for 
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of employment except if 
the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: . . . 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or 
city jail, or other place of legal confinement.. . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (West 2004). When this Court interprets any 
statute, the rules of statutory construction require the Court to look first "to the 
statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language, unless the language 
is ambiguous." Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at |^ 12. The legislature selected each term 
2
 A governmental function is "any act, failure to act, operation, function, or 
undertaking of a governmental entity...." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a). Law 
enforcement activities are governmental functions. Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 
775 P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1989); Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1256 (Utah App. 
1989). In this case, the troopers were engaged in law enforcement activity at the 
time of the subject incident. Accordingly, the conduct at issue is a governmental 
function and the State is entitled to immunity. The act waives immunity if the 
alleged injury arises out of a negligent act of an employee. In this case, Peck has 
alleged that the troopers' negligence caused his injury. R. 3 & 6, Complaint Yh 17, 
31. Accordingly, for purposes of the motion for judgment on the pleadings and 
this appeal, the Highway Patrol's immunity for exercising a governmental function 
has been waived. 
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advisedly, and the Court gives "effect to each term according to its ordinary and 
accepted meaning." Pace, 2006 UT App. 494 at ^ 6. 
This case turns on the meaning of incarcerated in any place of legal 
confinement. If Peck was incarcerated in a place of legal confinement, his suit 
against the Highway Patrol is barred. Peck argued before the trial court that he 
was not incarcerated because at no time was he either convicted or confined in a 
physical building. But the meaning of incarceration in a place of legal 
confinement is not so limited. 
The governmental immunity act does not define incarcerated, place, or legal 
confinement. But the ordinary meaning of incarcerate is "[t]o imprison" or "[t]o 
confine." Pace, 2006 UT App. 494 at \ 6 (quoting The American Heritage 
Dictionary 430 (4th ed. 2000). Confinement is understood to mean "[t]he act of 
imprisoning or restraining someone." Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 127 (2d 
pocket ed. 2001). Place is defined as "an area with definite or indefinite 
boundaries, a portion of space; a room or space." The American Heritage 
Dictionary (4th ed. 2000) (online version http://www.bartleby.com). 
Following the plain and ordinary meaning of incarceration and for over 
twenty years, this Court has interpreted incarceration to mean more than 
conviction. In Emery v. State, 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (1971), this 
Court interpreted incarceration broadly. In that case, the plaintiffs sued the state 
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for the death of a voluntary patient at the state hospital. Id. at 1296. They argued 
that the incarceration exception did not apply because the patient was not 
incarcerated, having voluntarily gone to the mental facility, and was thus neither 
convicted nor located in a jail or prison. In holding that the state was immune 
from liability, the Emery court stated that "in reading the whole section," the 
statute applied to a person who "cannot be released without some kind of 
permission." Ttf. at 1297. 
Five years later, in Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976), the family of 
a murder victim sued the state for negligently allowing a prisoner to escape. This 
Court held that the state was immune from liability because the injury arose out of 
the prisoner's incarceration or, in other words, being in the control of the state. Id. 
at 244. 
Following the reasoning of Epting, the Court examined the applicability of 
the incarceration exception to the death of an inmate following surgery at the state 
prison's hospital facilities. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978). The 
Madsen court held that the exception to the waiver of immunity applied to bar suit 
because at the time of the inmate's death he was under the control of the prison 
officials, even though the injuries were a result of the surgery. Id. at 93. 
Based on this Court's prior precedents and the plain and ordinary meaning 
of "incarceration" and "confinement," the Court of Appeals rejected the notion that 
for the incarceration exception to apply, a person must be convicted or confined in 
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a jail, prison or mental hospital. Pace, 2006 UT App. 494 at f 7. In Pace, the wife 
of an arrestee sued the St. George Police Department for wrongful death, claiming 
that the police were negligent in failing to properly search and secure him. When 
officers allowed the arrestee to use the restroom at the police department, he fatally 
shot himself. Id. at U 2. Pace's wife sued, and the police department moved to 
dismiss based on governmental immunity, claiming that the suicide arose out of, 
was connected with, or was a result of Pace's incarceration. The trial court agreed 
and dismissed the case, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at H 7. 
The Pace court stated that because the suicide happened when Pace's 
husband was under arrest and in police custody, he was therefore, "under police 
control," and "could not be released without some kind of permission." Id. Thus, 
the court concluded that the death "occurred 'in connection with' [Mr. Pace's] 
incarceration in a 'place of legal confinement.'" Id. (quotations omitted). Pace's 
physical location at the police department was not determinative of the application 
the incarceration exception. 
In this case, the trial court incorrectly determined that the Highway Patrol is 
immune only when the incarcerated person is, at some time, confined or located in 
a building. The trial court's construction of the statute - limiting "place of legal 
confinement" to mean only a physical facility or building owned by the state - is 
unfounded. There is no support for the trial court's conclusion that in order for the 
incarceration exception to apply, a person must be confined in a physical facility or 
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building owned by the state. Nothing in the plain language of the immunity act or 
case law supports such a limited view. 
Like the arrestee in Pace, Peck was confined to a place of legal 
incarceration but not in a building such as a jail, prison, or mental hospital. The 
difference between Pace and this case is that Peck was not in a location with four 
walls. But that is a distinction without a difference because Peck was in the 
control of the state and could not leave without permission. He was confined to an 
"area with definite boundaries." The incarceration exception applies to this case 
and bars Peck's negligence claim against the Highway Patrol.3 
Further, the purpose of the incarceration exception is frustrated under the 
trial court's limited view of place of legal confinement. The purpose of the 
exception is to protect the state's efforts to maintain control of those individuals in 
state custody. That purpose cannot be achieved if immunity applies only when a 
person in state custody was, at some time, confined or located within a building. 
Moreover, this Court has consistently held that "c[t]he words "arising out 
o f are very broad, general and comprehensive. They are commonly understood to 
mean originating from, growing out of, or flowing from, and require only that 
3
 Furthermore, it is well settled that the incarceration exception applies to 
cases where the injuries that have occurred outside of a physical facility or 
building owned by the state. See Epting, 546 P.2d at 244; Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 
1255, 1256-57 (Utah App. 1989). 
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there be some causal relationship between the injury and the risk [provided for].'" 
Taylor v. Ogden City Sck Dist, 927 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1996) (alteration in 
original, citations omitted). In other words, all that needs io be shown is a "but for" 
link between the condition stated in Section 63-30-10(10), and the plaintiffs 
claimed injuries. Id. See also Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at \ 15. 
Here, Peck's injuries would not have happened "but for" his 
arrest, his confinement in police custody, and his restraint in handcuffs. Peck was 
undoubtedly in the control of the state; he could not leave without some kind of 
permission, and he was confined in an area of defined boundaries. The fact that he 
was not yet in a physical facility or building owned by the state makes no 
difference. Peck was incarcerated in a place of legal confinement, and therefore 
the Highway Patrol is statutorily immune from his negligence claims. The trial 
court erred when it denied the Highway Patrol's motion to dismiss and motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
CONCLUSION 
The Highway Patrol retains its immunity from suit for Peck's negligence 
claims. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of the 
Highway Patrol's motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings and 
dismiss Peck's suit with prejudice. 
-12-
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ZCr day of June 2007. 
Peggy E. SktaJb l 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellants State of Utah 
and Utah Highway Patrol 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing, BRIEF OF 
APPELLANTS, was served by U.S. mail this -^Xf) ~day of June, 2007, to the 
following: 
Bart J. Johnsen, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0340 
Attorney for Thomas Peck 
Ctffof* buXj2eU^ -CJptAAdJL 
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ADDENDUM A 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 1 9 2007 
SALT LAKE COUKTY MY) 
IN Mil ' I HUM1 M'IMl I \l M M Kit I 1'OM' I IN AMU H 'K 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS PECK, aka Thomas Joseph Peck, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, and THE UTAH 
HIGHWAY PATROI ,, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLEADINGS 
Case No -.h»iP6474 
1 Judge Stephen Henriod 
This matter having come before the 1 \>ui i on ddendants State of Utah and the Utah 
Highway Patrol's (collectively, the "State") Motion, foi Ji idgi i lei it • : n tl :i e PI sadii igs tl le C ;: \ 11 t 
having reviewed the motion and memoranda, concludes as follows: 
This ( isc iin'il'i » " | il i "i H 'M'l'U'ml'i i " MMti, when t<,\< i "jj , 
Highway Patrol troopers placed plaintiff Thomas Peck ("Mr. Peck") under arrest for driving 
K incgc^ mai j„iiug the anrest, the troopers negligently 
caused him to fall to the ground resulting in injuries. The State has filed the current Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings alleging that the State is immune from suit under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
1 
DISCUSSION 
The State alleges that it is immune from Mr. Peck's lawsuit under Utah Code Annotated 
§ 63-30-10, which states that "[ijmmunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for 
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results f rom:. . . 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal 
confinement.. . ." The issue in this case is whether the State falls under this immunity waiver 
exception for injuries arising out incarceration. 
Mr. Peck and the State focus heavily on whether Mr. Peck was incarcerated, but the Court 
believes the more important question is whether the injuries took place in a "state prison, county 
or city jail, or other place of legal confinement." The State does not dispute that Mr. Peck was 
not incarcerated in a state prison, county, or city jail, but instead contends that he was in a place 
of legal confinement. In interpreting "oxner place of legal confinement," it is important to 
remember the well known maxim of statutory construction that "when a statute contains a list of 
specific words that relate to a certain type of item and those words are followed by a general 
word, the general word should be construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those 
objects enumerated by the preceding specific words." State of Utah v. Ireland, 2006 UT 17 H 13, 
133P.3d396. 
2 
Using that general principal, a state prison, county or city jail are all similar in that they 
. :i • vr .. .-! . ... a,
 ;pal government . I Ins 
c o m m o n sense interpretation also accords with the case law. See e.g. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 
92, 93 (Utah 1978) (incarcerated in state pr ison hospi ta l ) ; Emery v. State of Utah, 483 P.2d 1296, 
1296 (Utah 1971) (incarcerated in a state 1 u >: I;J > i t i tl); S'k ? ffieh 1v. 1 w I u ?/ 445 P 2< I 367, 3-68 ( I Jit J ,. 
1968) (incarcerated in a state prison). This interpretation is not undermined by the Sta te ' s 
was in police custody inside a police static o \ IT Anp 4lM « 2, 567 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 
1 he State also cites Epting v. State oj h iah where the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
actions of an individual who was in state prison, but escaped during a work release program, still 
arose "out of the incarceration of any person in the state p r i son" because he was still under pr ison 
• M >nti i )1 while doi ': ' * ] )! 2\ 1 2 12: 2< i II (I Jt. ill 1 
stands tor the proposition that once an individual has been incarcerated in a place of legal 
c ;::» ifii len lent (iiit i tl iat case, tl le state pi isoi it), that ii idi i ::liii la! ;::c i tii >" "»'< • +• "If >e incarcerated there for 
purposes of the immunity statute as long as he is under the state 's control, even though he m a y 
1
 \K phv.iuil ly presnU \\\ IIK. iacihty when Ihc injury occurs
 S,KC in Epting, Mr . I ^ c k w a s 
never incarcerated in a physical facility owned by the State. 
3 
^\ 
Because Mr. Peck was never confined in a physical facility owned and controlled by the 
State, he was never incarcerated in a "place of legal confinement" under the immunity statute and 
therefore the incarceration exception does not apply. Therefore, the State has waived immunity 
under § 63-30-10 and the State's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is accordingly DENIED. 
DATED this (f day of January, 2007. 
STEPH37HSMO57F 
DISTRICpCpURf JX ' 
4 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I heieby certify \hrM 1 mailed a \Y\iC and correct copy of \he foiegoing OYV 
Judgment on the Pleadings, to the following, this \6\ day of January, 2007: 
Reed M. Stringham III 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O.Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Bart J. jonnsen 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0340 
Udi^SksujL 
ADDENDUM B 
F O R M E R G O V E R N M E N T A L I M M U N I T Y ACT 
c ^3-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities 
from suit 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in 
this chapter, all governmental entities are im-
mune from suit for any injury which results 
from the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, 
or other governmental health care facility, and 
from an approved medical, nursing, or other 
professional health care clinical training pro-
gram conducted in either public or private facil-
ities. 
(2) Subsections (2)(a) through (c) are unique 
or essential core governmental functions and, 
notwithstanding the waiver of immunity provi-
sions of Section 63-30-10, governmental enti-
ties, political subdivisions, and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from the implementation of 
or the failure to: 
(a) implement measures to control the causes 
of epidemic and communicable diseases and 
other conditions significantly affecting the pub-
lic health or necessary to protect the public 
health as set out in Title 26A, Chapter 1, Local 
Health Departments; 
(b) investigate and control -MLSJM , .<*'> : >< 
rorism and disease as set out ii TitU 
ter 23b, Detection of Public He.<u\• 1 •• * * 
Act; and 
(c) respond to a national, state, or local emer-
gency, a public health emergency as defined in 
Section 26-23b~102, or a declaration by the 
President of the United States or other federal 
official requesting public health-related activi-
ties. 
(3)(a) For the purposes of this chapter only, 
the following state medical programs and ser 
vices performed at a state-owned university \vou 
pital are unique or essential to the con «.;* 
governmental activity in this state and are < .m 
sidered to be governmental functions: 
(i) care of a patient referred by anothei h< 
tal or physician because of the high risk nature 
of the patient's medical condition; 
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in 
Utah only at a state-owned university hospital 
or provided in Utah only by physicians em-
ployed at a state-owned university acting in the 
scope of their employment; 
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive ap 
propriate medical care or treatment at *nnt**.-< 
medical facility in Utah; and 
(iv) any other service or procedure performed 
at a state-owned university hospital or by physi-
cians employed at a state-owned university act-
ing in the scope of their employment that a 
court finds is unique or essential to the core of 
I^VefB^entaJ activity in this state. 
fa) M afiy claim under this Subsection (3) 
exceeds &e limits established in Section 
63-30-34, the claimant may submit the excess 
claim to the Board of Examiners and the Legis-
1. : ,ti i e under Tide 63, Chapter 6. 
(4) The management of flood waters and oth-
er natural disasters and the-construction, re-
pair, and operation of flood and storm systems 
by governmental entities are considered to be 
governmental functions, and governmental enti-
ties and their officers and employees are im-
mune from suit for any injury or damage result-
ing from those activities. 
(5) Officers and employees of a Children's 
Justice Center are immune from suit for any 
injury which results i r o m their joint intergov-
ernmental functions at a center created in Title 
62A. Chapter 4a, Child and Family Services. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 3; Laws 1978, c. 27, 
§ 2; Laws 1981, c. 116, § 2; Laws 1984, c. 33, 
§ 1; Laws 1985, c. 93, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 15. 
§ 1; Laws 1991, c. 248, § 7; Laws 2003, c. 3 / 
§ 5, eff. May 5, 2003. 
See, now, § 63-30d-201. 
§ 63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as 
admission or denial of liability—Effect of waiv-
er of immunity—Exclusive remedy—Joinder of 
employee—Limitations on personal liability 
(0(a) Nothing contained in this chapter, un-
less specifically provided, may be construed as 
an admission or denial of liability or responsi-
bility by or for governmental entities or their 
employees. 
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this, 
chapter, consent to be sued is granted, and 
liability of the entity shall>be determined as if 
the entity were a private person 
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is 
created by any waiver of immunity in this chap-
ter, nor may any provision of this chapter be 
construed as imposing strict liability or absolute 
liability. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed 
as adversely affecting any immunity from suit 
that a governmental entity or employee may 
otherwise assert under state or federal law. 
(3)(a) Except as provided in Subsection 
(3)(b), an action under this chapter against a 
governmental entity or its employee for an inju-
ry caused by an act or omission that occurs 
during the performance of the employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment, or un-
der color of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive 
remedy. 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any 
other civil action or proceeding based upon the 
same subject matter against the employee or the 
estate of the employee whose act or omission 
gave rise to the claim, unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through 
fraud or malice; 
STATE AFFAIRS 
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the 
conditions set forth in Subsection 
63-30-36(3)(c); or 
(iii) in a judicial or administrative proceeding 
the employee intentionally or knowingly gave, 
upon a lawful oath or in any form allowed by 
law as a substitute for an oath, false testimony 
material to the issue or matter of inquiry under 
this section. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action 
against a governmental entity in a representa-
tive capacity if the act or omission complained 
of is one for which the governmental entity may 
be liable, but no employee may be held person-
ally liable for acts or omissions occurring dur-
ing the performance of the employee's duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color 
of authority, unless it is established that: 
(a) the employee acted or failed to act due to 
fraud or malice; 
(b) the injury or damage resulted from the 
conditions set forth in Subsection 
63-30-36(3)(c); or 
(c) in a judicial or administrative proceeding 
the employee intentionally or knowingly gave, 
upon a lawful oath or in any form allowed by 
law as a substitute for an oath, false testimony 
material to the issue or matter of inquiry under 
this section. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 4; Laws 1978, c. 27, 
§ 3; Laws 1983, c. 129, § 3; Laws 1991, c. 76, 
§ 1; Laws 2002, c. 206, § 2, eff. May 6, 2002. 
See, now, § 63-30d-202. 
§ 63-30-5, Waiver of immunity as to contrac-
tual obligations 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entitle? is waived as to any contractual obli-
gation.' Actions arising out of contractual rights 
or obligations shall not be subject to the re-
quirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 
63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Divi-
sion of Water Resources is not liable for failure 
to deliver water from a reservoir or associated 
facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear 
River Development Act, if the failure to deliver 
the contractual amount of water is due to 
drought, other natural condition, or safety con-
dition that causes a deficiency in the amount of 
available water. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 5; Laws 1975, c. 189, 
§ 1; Laws 1978, c. 27, § 4; Laws 1983, c. 129, 
§ 4; Laws 1985, c. 82, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 251, 
§-»-
See now, § 63-30d-301. 
§ 63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions 
involving property 
Immunity from suit of all governmental enti-
ties is waived for the recovery of any property 
real or personal or for the possession thereof or 
to quiet title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages 
or other liens thereon or to determine any ad-
verse claim thereon, or secure any adjudication 
touching any mortgage or other lien said entity 
may have or claim on the property involved. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 6. 
See, now, § 63-30d-301. 
§ 63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for negligent 
damage, destruction or loss of seized property 
Immunity from suit of all governmental enti-
ties is waived as to any claim based on the 
negligent destruction, damage or loss of goods, 
merchandise or other property while in the pos-
session of any officer or agency of state or local 
government, including law enforcement offi-
cers, if the property was seized for the purpose 
of forfeiture under any provision of state law. 
Initiative B, adopted Nov. 7, 2000, eff. March 
20 ,2001 . 
§ 63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury 
caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous con-
dition of highways, bridges, or other structures 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of 
the exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 
63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmen-
tal entities is waived for any injury caused by a 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any 
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, side-
walk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other 
structure located on them. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 8. Laws 1991, c. 76, 
§ 2 . 
See, now, § 63-30d-301. 
§ 63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury 
from dangerous or defective public building, 
structure, or other public improvement—Ex-
ception 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of 
the exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 
63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmen-
tal entities is waived for any injury caused from 
a dangerous or defective condition of any public 
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other 
public improvement, 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 9; Laws 1991, c. 76, 
§ 3 . 
See, now, § 63-30d-301. 
§ 63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury 
caused by negligent act or omission of employ-
ee—Exceptions 
Immunity from suit of all governmental enti-
ties is waived for injury proximately caused by a 
negligent act or omission of an employee com-
mitted within the scope of employment except if 
the injury arises out of, in connection with, or 
results from: 
fOBME R GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
a\ the exercise or performance or the failure 
rcise or perform a discretionary function, 
*£LT or not the discretion is abused; 
*YtHss3ult, battery, false imprisonment, false 
jfL malicious prosecution, intentional tres-
, f f eSabuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, 
CSference with contract rights, infliction of 
2 * ^ anguish, or violation of civil rights; 
n> the issuance, denial, suspension, or revo-
cation of or by the failure or refusal to issue, 
S^T suspend' or revoke any permit, license, 
certificate, approval, order, or similar authori-
zation; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by 
making an inadequate or negligent inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judi-
cial or administrative proceeding, even if mali-
cfciis or without probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee 
whether or not it is negligent or intentional; 
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demon 
Itrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; 
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any 
Itite prison, county or city jail* or other place of 
legal confinement; 
:\t\) any natural condition on publicly owned 
or controlled lands, any condition existing in 
connection with an abandoned mine or mining 
operation, or any activity authorized by the 
School and Institutional Trust Lands Adminis-
tration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and 
Sate Lands; 
i (12) research or implementation of cloud 
management or seeding for the clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earth-
(juakes, or natural disasters; 
v (14) the construction, repair, or operation 
Hood or storm systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, 
While being driven in accordance with the re-
quirements of Section 41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective 
condition of airy highway, road, street, alley, 
j*$swalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, via-
**fy or other structure located on them; 
I) a ' a t e n t dangerous or latent defective 
? ™ u o n . of any public building, structure, 
**», reservoir,, or other public improvement; 
Wthe activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
&)fighting fire; 
fc) regulating, mitigating, or handling haz-
ardous materials or hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; 
W transporting or removing injured persons 
* place where emergency medical assistance 
^ ^ r e n ^ e r e d or where the person can be 
^^sfx^ed by a licensed ambulance service; or 
(0 intervening during dam emergencies; or 
(19) the exercise or performance or the fail-
ure to exercise or perform any function pursu-
ant to Title 73, Chapter 5a, Dam Safety, or Title 
73, Chapter 10, Board of Water Resources— 
Division of Water Resources, which immunity is 
in addition to all other immunities granted by 
law 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 10; Laws 1975, c. 194, 
§ 11; Laws 1982, c. 10, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 169, 
§ 1; Laws 1989, c. 185, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 187, 
§ 3; Laws 1989, c. 268, § 29; Laws 1990, c. 15, 
§§ 1,2; Laws 1990, c. 319, §§ 1,2; Laws 1991, 
c. 76, § 4; Laws 1995, c. 299, § 35, eff May 1, 
1995; Laws 1996, c. 159, § 6, eff. July I, 1996; 
Laws 1996, c. 264, § 1, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 
2001, c. 185, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001. 
See, now, § 63-30d-30J 
§ 63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking 
pi ivate property without compensat ion 
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution, immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for the recovery 
of compensation from the governmental entity 
when the governmental entity has taken or 
damaged private property for public uses with-
out just compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be as-
sessed according to the requirements of Title 78, 
Chapter 34, Eminent Domain 
Laws 1987, c. 75, § 3; Laws 1991, c. 76, § 5; 
Laws 2004, c. 223, § 9, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 
2004, c 267, § 47, efif. July 1, 2004. 
See, now, §§ 63^30d-301 and 63 ^ 
- v- - Atiorneys' fees for records "re-' 
quest. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for recovery of attorneys* fees 
under Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-802. 
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11: 
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys* fees under 
Subsection (1) may be filed contemporaneously 
.with a petition for i ei iew i mder S^tinn 
63-2-404; and 
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not 
apply. 
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that; is 
related to a claim for attorneys' fees under 
Subsection (1) may be brought contemporane-
ously with the claim for attorneys' fees or in a 
subsequent action. -
Laws 1991, c. 259, § ^) Laws 1992, c. 280, 
§ 56. 
22. 
